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DELAY, DOCUMENTATION AND THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
ROBERT L MISNER*
INTRODUCTION
Prompted by a desire to reduce criminal activity
by persons released pending trial,t and by a wish
to erect a fitting memorial to retiring Senator Sam
Ervin,2 the Ninety-Third Congress passed the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974.3 The Act stems from the
basic congressional assumption that the partici-
pants in the criminal justice system (i.e., the judges,
prosecutors and defense counsel) cannot be trusted
with the task of adequately protecting society's
interests in the swift administration of justice.4 To
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A.
1968, University of San Francisco; J.D. 1971, University
of Chicago. Reporter, Speedy Trial Planning Groups for
the United States District Court for the Districts of
Arizona and Southern California.
'The introduction to the Act states its purpose: "To
assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by
requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the super-
vision over persons released pending trial, and for other
purposes." Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619,
88 Stat. 2076 (1974). Congress relied upon Bureau of
Standards statistics to support the proposition that the
criminal defendant awaiting trial is not only a financial
and administrative burden to society, but often is a
danger to his community as well. In a study of 712
defendants during four weeks in 1968, the Bureau report
found that of 426 defendants on pretrial release, 47 were
re-arrested and formally charged with crimes committed
while on release. The study also purported to show that
defendants have an increased propensity to be re-arrested
when released more than 280 days. H.R. REP. No. 1508,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]. See also S. REP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
2 See, e.g., the statement of Representative Conyers,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Crime. Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R.
658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773, and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on theJudicimy, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 157 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. For
a discussion of Senator Ervin's role in the passage of the
Speedy Trial Act, see Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
43 U. CI. L. REv. 667, 673-74 (1976).
'The Speedy Trial Act was signed by President Ford
on January 3, 1975. It is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et
seq. (Supp. IV 1974).
4 Senator Ervin believed that society's interests in
speedy trials of criminal defendants were being inade-
quately protected by the participants in the legal system.
Consequently, separate speedy trial legislation was
deemed necessary. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 158.
The Congress also relied heavily upon a report by Yale
date, however, the Act has been met with an
unwelcome reception by the criminal justice sys-
tem.5 This article suggests that the participants in
the system may well take every opportunity to
undermine the effect of the Act, and thereby defeat
the goals it was intended to achieve.
The Act requires, with certain exceptions, that
a criminal defendant be tried within 100 days-of
arrest or service of summons.' Consequently, one
likely approach to subvert the intent of the Act will
be for the defense to claim that the time limits of
the Act are in conflict with the defendant's ability
to retain the counsel of his choice and are incon-
sistent with the defendant's right to be represented
by adequately prepared counsel. It may be argued
that the Act causes such a rush to judgment that
it is inconsistent with a defendant's right to an
adequately investigated and prepared defense.
Law School Professor Daniel Freed, which concluded
that the goal of the Judicial Conference's Model 50(b)
Plan, then in effect in all district courts, to reduce the
time required to bring a defendant to trial was largely
unrealized. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 261-333. See
also HousE REP'oRT, supra note 1, at 12-13. Testifying in
favor of handling the speedy trial issue through F.R.
CRIM. P. 50(b) plans to achieve the prompt disposition of
criminal trials were Rowland F. Kirks, director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 176-93; W. Vincent Rakestraw, assistant
attorney general, Office of Legislative Affairs, House Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 196-209; United States District
Judge Alphonso J. Zirpoli, Northern District of Califor-
nia, Chairman of the Committee on the Administration
of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, House Hearings, supra note 2, at 365-84.
(Rule 50(b) calls for the formulation of plans, by district
courts, for achieving the prompt disposition of criminal
cases.)
Another objection to the rule 50(b) plans is found in
Justice Douglas' dissent to the promulgation of rule 50(b):
There may be several better ways of achieving the
desired result [speedy trial]. This Court is not able
to make discerning judgments between various pol-
icy choices where the relative advantage 6f several
alternatives depends on extensive fact finding. That
is a "legislative" determination. Under our consti-
tutional system that function is left to the Congress
with approval or veto by the President.
406 U.S. 981-82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5 See text accompanying notes 114-44 infra.
6 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. IV 1974).
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Based upon adequacy of preparation claims,
defense counsel will argue that the "ends ofjustice"
require the time limits of the Act be extended.
This article asserts that the "ends ofjustice" exclu-
sion of the Act, when properly interpreted and
carefully administered, can be used to strike a
proper balance between society's interest in quick
resolution of criminal cases and the defendant's
right to a fair trial conducted by counsel in whom
7 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (Supp. IV 1974).
(h) The following periods of delay shall be ex-
cluded in computing the time within which an
information or an indictment must be filed, or in
computing the time within which the trial of any
such offense must commence:
(8)(A) Any period of delay resulting from
a continuance granted by any judge on his
own motion or at the request of the defendant
or his counsel or at the request of the attorney
for the Government, if thejudge granted such
continuance on the basis of his findings that
the ends ofjustice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and
the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period
of delay resulting from a continuance granted
by the court in accordance with this paragraph
shall be excludable under this subsection un-
less the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the
granting of such continuance outweigh the
best interests of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trail. I
(B) The factors, among others, which a
judge shall consider in determining whether to
grant a continuance under subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph in any case are as follows:
(i) Whether the failure to grant such
a continuance in the proceeding would
be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a mis-
carriage ofjustice.
(ii) Whether the case taken as a whole
is so unusual and so complex, due to the
number of defendants or the nature of
the prosecution or otherwise, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate prepa-
ration within the periods of time estab-
lished by this section.
(iii) Whether delay after the grand
jury proceedings have commenced, in a
case where arrest precedes indictment, is
caused by the unusual complexity of the
factual determination to be made by the
grand jury or by events beyond the con-
trol of the court or the Government.
(C) No continuance under paragraph (8) (A)
of this subsection shall be granted because of
general congestion of the court's calendar, or
lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain
available witnesses on the part of the attorney
for the Government.
he has confidence and with whom a confidential
relationship can be maintained.
Furthermore, this article asserts that in order to
protect society's interests in speedy trials, courts
should require specific information from defense
counsel to bolster the right to counsel claim, rather
than relying upon the stipulation of the defense
and prosecution that a basis for delay exists. This
is important because the parties' motives for seek-
ing delays conflict with society's interest in prompt
actions. Confidential or potentially damaging in-
formation may, when necessary, be communicated
to the trial judge or to another judge ex parte and
in camera. This will avoid the need to frustrate the
purposes of the Speedy Trial Act under the pre-
tense that the time requirements of the Act are
inconsistent with the sixth amendment right-to-
counsel provision. Such a solution, which recog-
nizes that the Speedy Trial Act now prohibits
stipulated continuances,8 assumes a good faith at-
tempt by the judiciary to implement the Speedy
Trial Act irrespective of a judge's personal beliefs
in the wisdom of Congress' action in passing the
Act.
The right to counsel problem serves to highlight
the general problems of implementing The Speedy
Trial Act and is chosen because it is a common
criticism of the Act, because it offers a good illus-
tration of attorney excuses for delay, and because
it involves the interrelationship of two separate and
potentially conflicting constitutional concerns.
I. PROVISIONS OF THE Acr
The Speedy Trial Act sets out to remedy delay
in three separate ways. First, it requires that from
July 1, 1975, to July 1, 1979, trials of all persons
held in detention solely because they are awaiting
trial shall commence no later than ninety days
following the beginning of continuous detention?
Second, it mandates that after July 1, 1979, crim-
inal defendants be tried within 100 days after arrest
or service of summons excluding certain limited
periods of delay.10 Finally, it creates experimental,
pre-trial service agencies in ten selected districts to
provide support and supervisory services to non-
custodial defendants awaiting trial.i
Although at first glance it may appear that
Congress has merely set time limits for the key
SSee, .g., United States v. LaCruz, 441 F. Supp. 1261,
1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
'0 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. IV 1974).
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-55 (Supp. IV 1974).
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events in the criminal justice process much in the
same vein as most state speedy trial statutes,12 in
fact the Speedy Trial Act is a unique approach to
correct delays in the administration of criminal
justice. The special quality of the Act lies in Con-
gress' decision to place the responsibility to exper-
iment, to critique, and to plan compliance efforts
on the individual courts during the transitional
stages when the ultimate time limits and sanctions
of the Act are not in total operation." Unfortu-
nately, most district courts have totally ignored the
planning aspects of the Act and consequently many
have little or no experience with the day-to-day
practical difficulties presented by it. 14 For these
recalcitrant districts, July 1, 1979 (the date on
which the time limits and sanctions go fully into
effect), may be the first day on which serious
concern will be shown for the Speedy Trial Act, if
any concern is shown at all.
For purposes of this article it is unnecessary to
go into great detail regarding the interim time
limits or the pre-trial service agencies. The interim
limits relating to the in-custody defendant do little
more than assure in-custody cases the highest prior-
ity in trial scheduling.' 5 If the in-custody defendant
is not tried within ninety days, he is to be released. 0
The experimental services agencies, which are gov-
12 For a discussion of state speedy trial statutes, see
Poulos and Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The
ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
357 (1976).
13 For a general description of the bill, see HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-28.
'4 Misner, District Court Compliance with the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974: The Ninth Circuit Experience, 1977 ARIZ. ST.
L:I. 1, 15-25.
IS See, e.g., REVISED MODEL STATEMENT OF TIME LIMIT
AND PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF
CRIMINAL CASES 2 (Speedy Trial Directive No. 11, Feb.
18, 1976).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) (Supp. IV 1974). It is question-
able whether the computation of the 90-day period can
take into account the excludable time provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h). The Administrative Conference has
taken the position that the exclusions do not apply to the
in-custody defendant during the interim period. The
Justice Department has taken the contrary position. In
the first case dealing with the issue, the Ninth Circuit
held that the excludable time provisions are not appli-
cable to the in-custody defendant. United States v. Tir-
asso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976). Other courts, how-
ever, have failed to follow the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Corley, 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
United States v. Mejias, 417 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Martinez, 538
F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Masko, 415 F.
Supp. 1317 (W.D. Wis. 1976). For a discussion of exclud-
able time, see text accompanying notes 21-26 infa.
erned by the administrative office of the United
States Courts, are of little immediate concern to
the majority of individual district courts.' 7 The
comparatively complicated and far-reaching pro-
visions relating to the 1979 standards, on the other
hand, directly involve the individual district courts
and are a legitimate source of concern.
The ultimate 100 day arrest-to-trial standard is
divided into three segments: a thirty-day limit
between arrest and the filing of an indictment or
information;' 8 a ten-day limit between indictment
and arraignment; 9 and a sixty-day limit between
arraignment and trial.20 However, these time pe-
riods do not become effective until the fifth year
after the enactment of the Act and during the five
year phase-in period, the time standards vary.
All time periods are tolled by a limited number
of exceptions which mitigate somewhat the appar-
ent stringency of the Act.2' The Act specifically
excludes from the restrictions delay resulting from
physical and mental examinations, trials on other
charges, interlocutory appeals, hearings on pre-trial
motions, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
rule 40 transfers.22 The Act also recognizes other
exclusions such as delays due to deferred prosecu-
tion to allow the defendant to demonstrate his
good behavior, the absence of defendants and wit-
nesses, and other procedural difficulties.2 3 The Act
contains an escape clause which allows the court to
delay the trial if, in granting the continuance, the
ends of justice "outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.' ' 4
Because it is possible to use this exception to emas-
culate the operation of the Speedy Trial Act, such
17 The individual districts chosen as experimental dis-
tricts are: District of Maryland, Eastern District of Mich-
igan, Western District of Missouri, Eastern District of
New York, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Central
District of California, Northern District of Georgia,
Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of New
York, and Northern District of Texas. For a discussion of
the pretrial service agencies, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF TITLE I AND TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL
Act OF 1974, 25-44 (1976).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
2°id
21 The applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h) to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3164 is discussed at note 16 supra.
22 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (Supp. IV 1974). Rule 40 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regulates the re-
moval of persons from one federal district court to an-
other.
2id
24 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A) (Supp. IV 1974).
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a delay cannot be granted unless the court finds on
the record that a miscarriage ofjustice would likely
result if the continuance was not granted; that the
nature of the case is such that adequate preparation
cannot be expected within the statutory time
frame; or that the delay is caused by the complexity
of the case before the grand jury.25 The Act specif-
ically states, however, that general court conges-
tion, lack of diligent preparation by the govern-
ment, or failure of the government to obtain an
available witness are unacceptable causes of de-
lay.
26
Sanctions during the phase-in period are limited
to the release of those persons being held in deten-
tion solely to await trial and to the review of the
conditions of release for "high risk" defendants
who are not tried within ninety days after that
designation has been made.27 After July 1, 1979,
more severe sanctions become effective. At that
point the court may, upon motion of the defendant,
move to dismiss the complaint, information, or
indictment against the individual with or without
prejudice. 2s Failure of the defendant to move for
dismissal prior to trial or plea will constitute a
waiver of his right to a dismissal.29 Moreover,
sanctions are provided against attorneys who inten-
tionally delay the proceedings.
3
0
2" 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). For a
discussion of the types of delay envisioned by Congress to
fall within the "ends of justice" exclusion, see ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE-
LINES OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
OF 1974, 18-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES].
See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, AMENDED GUIDELINES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE SPEEDY TRIAL AcT OF 1974, 22C-22G (1976) [here-
inafter cited as AMENDED GUIDELINES]; HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 33-34; SENATE REPORT, Supra note 1, at
39-41.
26 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1974).
27 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
28 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
29 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
0 Sanctions are detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (Supp.
IV 1974):
In any case in which counsel for the defendant or
the attorney for the Government (1) knowingly
allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing
the fact that a necessary witness would be unavail-
able for trial; (2) files a motion solely for the purpose
of.delay which he knows is totally frivolous and
without merit; (3) makes a statement for the pur-
pose of obtaining a continuance which he knows to
be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or (4) otherwise willfully fails to pro-
ceed to trial without justification consistent with
section 3161 of this chapter, the court may punish
any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(A) in the case of an appointed defense counsel,
Finally, the Act provides an all-purpose escape
clause which authorizes the Judicial Conference,
upon application of a district court, to suspend in
that district the time limits of section 3161 (c) which
govern the arraignment-to-trial interval for up to
one year.31 For the time limits to be suspended, the
district must be in a state of'"judicial emergency,"
' 2
and, even then, time limits are not truly suspended
but are extended from 60 to 180 days.33 The Judi-
cial Conference can grant a suspension only after
the Judicial Council of the circuit finds, inter alia
that the existing resources of the district are being
efficiently utilized. 4
To leave a discussion of the substantive provi-
sions of the Speedy Trial Act without mentioning
the planning aspects of the Act would be mislead-
ing. The Speedy Trial Act is first and foremost a
planning bill, a fact which is often overlooked. The
Act assumes that its substantive provisions are
workable, but gives the district courts a four-year
period in which to comment on the substantive
provisions and to determine the resources they will
need to comply with the mandated time restraints.
As the House Report summarized the issue:
The heart of the speedy trial concept... is the
planning process. These provisions recognize the
by reducing the amount of compensation that
otherwise would have been paid to such coun-
sel pursuant to section 3006A of this title in an
amount not to exceed 25 per centum thereof;
(B) in the case of a counsel retained in connec-
tion with the defense of a defendant, by im-
posing on such counsel a fine of not to exceed
25 per centum of the compensation to which
he is entitled in connection with his defense of
such defendant;
(C) by imposing on any attorney for the Gov-
ernment a fine of not to exceed $250;
(D) by denying any such counsel or attorney
for the Government the right to practice before
the court considering such case for a period of
not to exceed ninety days; or
(E) by filing a report with an appropriate
disciplinary committee.
The authority to punish provided for by this sub-
section shall be in addition to any other authority
or power available to such court.
31 18 U.S.C. § 3174(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
32 "Judicial emergency" is the term used by the Act
itself. 18 U.S.C.,§ 3174 (Supp. IV 1974).
3 The Act also provides that the Judicial Conference
can generally grant only one extension. 18 U.S.C. §
3174(c) (Supp. IV 1974). Additional extensions must be
granted by Congress. Id. If'Congress fails to act on the
request within six months, the Judicial Conference may
grant an additional suspension. Id.
. 18 U.S.C. § 3174(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
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fact that the Congress-by merely imposing uni-
form time limits for the disposition of criminal cases,
without providing the mechanism for increasing the
resources of the courts and helping to initiate crim-
inal justice reform which would increase the effi-
ciency of the system-is making a hollow promise
out of the Sixth Amendment.a
Similar characterizations of the Act can be found
in the Senate Report,3 6 the House Hearings,3 7 the
House debate,38 and the Senate debate.3 9
II. PROTECTED INTERESTS OF THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT: SOCIETAL VS. DEFENDANT INTERESTS
In enacting the Speedy Trial Act, Congress was
aware of the various interests generally viewed as
as HOUSEREPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
"6 The overall function of S. 754 is to encourage the
Federal criminal justice system to engage in comprehen-
sive planning and budgeting toward the goal of achieving
speedy trial. The most widely known section of the bill is
the first section which imposes the time limits. However,
the most important sections of the bill are the planning
process sections (sections 3165-69) which provide a plan-
ning process whereby each district court formulates a
plan for the implementation of speedy trial, and sets out
the additional resources necessary to meet the limits of
section 3161.
The planning process sections are critical to the bill's
success because they provide the vital link between the
Federal criminal justice system and the appropriations
process. In summary they provide the courts and the
United States Attorneys with a mechanism to plan for
the implementation of 90-day trials in a systematic man-
ner, to try innovative techniques on a pilot basis, to
itemize the additional resources necessary to achieve the
90-day trial goal, and to communicate with Congress
concerning its plans and the additional budget requests.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
17 In the House hearings on the Act, Senator Ervin
commented:
I believe, after years of studying this problem, that
S. 754 can begin to end this seemingly hopeless
morass. The bill is based upon the premise that the
courts, undermanned, starved for funds, and utiliz-
ing 18th century management techniques, simply
cannot cope with burgeoning caseloads. The con-
sequence is delay and plea bargaining. The solution
is to create initiative within the system to utilize
modern management techniques and to provide
additional resources to the courts where careful
planning so indicates.
House Hearings, supra note 2, at 158.
38 Representative Cohen stated: "[Tlhe most impor-
tant provisions of this bill concern the process by which
the district courts shall study the problems of pretrial
delay and plan for the implementation of the act's time
limits." 120 CONG. REC. 41,775 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE DEBATE].
120 CONG. REc. 24,660 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE DEBATE].
falling under the protection of the sixth amend-
ment.4° As Justice Brennan noted in Dickey v. Flor-
ida: "The Speedy Trial Clause protects societal
interests, as well as those of the accused .... Just
as delay may impair the ability of the accused to
defend himself, so it may reduce the capacity of
the government to prove its case.,
41
More specifically, the societal, as opposed to the
defendant's, interest in speedy trials can be viewed
in the traditional terminology as encompassing
elements of specific and general deterrence, retri-
bution, isolation and rehabilitation. The isolation
or quarantine argument for a speedy trial can be
found in the Speedy Trial Act itself. The introduc-
tion of the Act states as its purpose "to assist in
reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by
requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the
supervision over persons released pending trial, and
for other purposes., 42 Congress relied upon Bureau
of Standards statistics to support the proposition
that the criminal defendant awaiting trial is not
only a financial and administrative burden to so-
ciety, but often is a danger to his community as
well. The Bureau of Standards study purported to
show that defendants had an increased propensity
to be re-arrested when released more than 280
days.' s In addition to this isolation interest, society
also can claim both specific and general deterrence
benefits gained in the swift and sure punishment
of wrongoers. Society has a legitimate interest in
the quick administration of criminal justice and in
impressing upon both actual and potential offend-
ers the fact that wrongdoing will be punished 44
Similarly, societal need for a retributive response
to crime may require a strong temporal nexus
'oSee, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note I, at 15. The
imprecision of the constitutional right to a speedy trial
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1971):
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the right to
speedy trial is a more vague concept than other
procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to
determine with precision when the right has been
denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too
long in a system where justice is supposed to be
swift but deliberate.
407 U.S. at 521 (footnote omitted).
41 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970). See also 407 U.S. at 519.
42 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88
Stat, 2076 (1974). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at
519.
4a HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
' 398 U.S. at 42 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOE CRIMINAL
JusrICE, SPEEDY TRIAL 10-11 (Approved Draft 1978));
United States ex re. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88,
93 (2d Cir. 1969) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 70
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between the act and the punishment.4 5 Finally,
rehabilitative efforts focused upon those eventually
found guilty may be lessened if there is a long,
non-productive time wasted awaiting trial.46
The defendant's sixth amendment interest can
be characterized as an interest in his physical free-
dom awaiting the outcome of charges, his freedom
from the anxiety of a pending criminal prosecution,
and his interest in a fair trial not marred by faulty
memories or disappearing or diminished evi-
dence.' 7 Although the courts have been long on
rhetoric concerning defendant's theoretical inter-
ests in a speedy trial, the fact remains that most
defendants benefit more by delay than by speed.
In the relatively few cases decided by the Supreme
Court'8 and in most of the cases decided at the
appellate level,'49 the discussion of the defendant's
right to a speedy trial has centered on the fact that
at least part of delay is attributable directly to the
defendant. Delay, not quick resolution, thus ap-
pears to be defendant's major concern at the trial
level.
III. PARTICIPANTS' INTEREST IN DELAY
The greatest difficulty in effectuating the societal
and defendant interests protected by the sixth
amendment is that often those charged with pro-
tecting the societal interests (the prosecution) and
those upon whom the speedy trial right is individ-
ually conferred (the defendants) wish to have not
a speedy trial, but a delayed one. As Senator Ervin
'4 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,520 (1971) (citing
J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGIsLATION 326 (Ogden
ed. 1931)).
' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1971) (citing
NATIONAL COMM. ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE, To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DoMEsTIc
TRANQUILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, 152
(1969)).
47 In Barker v. Wingo the United States Supreme Court
constructed a four-prong balancing test to determine
whether an individual's speedy trial rights had been
violated. Factors to be considered in the balancing test
include the length of delay, the reasons for delay, defend-
ant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant.
407 U.S. at 530. Defendant's speedy trial interests are
considered when discussing the fourth factor. For a de-
tailed summary of the case law subsequent to Barker and
an account of the use of the fourth factor in the lower
courts see Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v.
Wingo in the Lower Courts, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 11 (1975).
' See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434
(1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1971). For a
compilation of cases from the United States Supreme
Court, see Rudstein, supra note 47, at 11-13.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 850
(D.C, Cir. 1975).
noted in his testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee:
There is no question in my mind that speedy trial
will never be a reality until Congress makes it clear
that it will no longer tolerate delay. Unfortunately,
while it is in the public interest to have speedy
trials, the parties involved in the criminal process
do not feel any pressure to go to trial. The Court,
defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor may
have different reasons not to push for trial, but they
all have some reason. The over-worked courts, pros-
ecutor, and defense attorneys depend on delay in
order to cope with their heavy caseloads. The end
of one trial only means the start of another. To
them, there is little incentive to move quickly in
what they see as an unending series of cases. The
defendant, of course, is in no hurry for trial because
he wishes to delay his day of reckoning as long as
possible.50
With this concern one of the major goals of the
Speedy Trial Act is to avoid a situation in which
the prosecutor and defense counsel can stipulate to
delay and thus infringe upon society's right to a
speedy trial of those charged with violating a crim-
inal provision.
A. Defense Interest in Delay
Delay can be sought and used by the defense in
a number of ways. On the one hand, delay may be
constitutionally mandated to preserve the defend-
ant's right to an adequately prepared defense,
while on the other hand, defendant delay may be
totally inconsistent with an efficient and just sys-
tem if it results in witnesses' failing to appear at
trial.
Defendant's desire for delay can be viewed
roughly in four separate ways: lawyer-directed de-
lays, defendant's "comfort" delays, pre-trial tacti-
cal delays and trial tactical delays.
There is some indication that defense counsel
unhappiness with the Speedy Trial Act stems not
so much from the way the Act affects defendants,
but rather from the havoc it causes to counsel's
ability to control his own calendar. 5' Some of the
lawyer-directed reasons, such as health problems of
counsel, 2 are obviously valid. Just as clearly, delay
to allow the defendant to "earn" money to pay
counsel, 53 or delay because lawyers would rather
50 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 158.
51 See text accompanying note 136 infira.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
53 In his study of delay in the Chicago Preliminary
Hearing Court, the Chicago Criminal Division Court,
the Pittsburgh Common Pleas Court, the District Court
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not spend a great deal of time in court' are
unacceptable reasons. Within this category of law-
yer-oriented delay, however, are classifications such
as vacations by lawyers, and presence of the lawyer
in other criminal cases which demand more im-
mediate attention.S Although conflicting sched-
ules may pose issues of professional courtesy be-
tween the participants in the system, 56 continu-
ances should be granted for conflicts only for short
periods of time and only when such conflicts are
totally unavoidable.5 7 Such a policy is dictated by
the congressional decision that speedy trials are of
high priority. Other than continuances which are
constitutionally mandated," defense counsel must
be brought to the same standard of readiness de-
of the District of Columbia, and the Minneapolis District
Court, Levin concluded:
The paramount goals of a private defense attorney
in criminal court center around his fee and the
amount of time he devotes to a case. First, the
attorney wants to be certain to receive his fee. This
is likely to be a problem because of the typical
defendant's low income (even if he can "afford" a
private attorney). If the case were disposed of with
minimum delay, this type of defendant usually
would not have enough time to scrape together a
fee. More importantly, the attorney wants to receive
the fee before the final disposition of the case.
Afterward a defendant may be incarcerated, which
greatly reduces the probability of receiving a fee, or
he may lose his job or simply "disappear." Also,
even when he is acquitted or receives probation
afterward the defendant is often hostile toward his
- attorney.
Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES
83, 91 (1975). But this motive is not relevant to the public
defender. Id. at 113.
54 Id. at 104.
The issue of counsel's schedule conflicts most often
arises in a defendant's claim that he has a right to choose
his own particular counsel to represent him. See, e.g.,
United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977).
56 Typical of individuals involved in daily face-
to-face relations, the judges and the defense attor-
neys actively stress "getting along with each other"
and minimizing conflict. For this reason and others
even when the defense attorneys' actions increase
delay, the judges (except in Minneapolis) tend to
accommodate them a good deal.
Levin, supra note 53, at 91.
r
7 The apparent reason for counsel unavailability due
to schedule conflicts is that there are relatively few com-
petent defense counsel. The observation concerning the
limited number of available defense counsel has been
made without documentation in a number of articles
critical of the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., Kozinski, That
Can of Worms: The Speedy Trial Act, 62 A.B.A.J. 862, 863
(1973).
58 See text accompanying note 161 infra.
manded of the Court and of the prosecution in the
Speedy Trial Act.s9
Just as some delays are associated with the con-
venience interests of the lawyer, other delays are
sought to further the creature-comforts of the de-
fendant. The most obvious delay of this type is
that sought for the defendant who is awaiting trial
while on bond.60 But it is the on-bond defendant
to which the Speedy Trial Act particularly is di-
rected."1 Other instances of delays to benefit the
defendant's physical surroundings are those situa-
tions in which a jailed defendant seeks a delay in
order to avoid going to another institution. 62 Fi-
nally, particularly in those cases where the defend-
ant is a substance-addict, delay may be justifiably
sought in order that his health might be restored
before trial.63
The variations on reasons for delay increase as
one approaches trial. Considering the high per-
centage of criminal cases which terminate in guilty
pleas, it is no surprise that many of the delays in
the pre-trial stages are tactically directed at better-
ing the defendant's bargaining position." There is
a widely held belief that continuances are granted
because of the defense threat to plead not guilty
and conduct a full-length trial.' Although this
conclusion has been juestioned, it would appear
59 "No continuance under paragraph (8) (A) of this
subsection shall be granted because of general congestion
of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the party of the
attorney for the Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C)
(Supp. IV 1974).
60 Levin, supra note 53, at 109.
" Se text accompanying note 42 supra.
62 United States v.Johnson, 579 F.2d 122, 124 (1st Cir.
1978).
6 A delay for health reasons of the defendant is allow-
able under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4): "Any period of delay
resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally
incompetent or physically unable to stand trial." How-
ever, the courts have been aware that the alleged ill
health of the defendant can be used as a ploy to gain
additional delay. The issue of defendant's health can be
used in devious ways by counsel. See, e.g., United States
v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
r' See United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119,
1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In the legislative history, there is
constantly expressed a fear that the Speedy Trial Act will
result in better plea bargains for defendants. The argu-
ment states that if all defendants were to demand jury
trials, the system could not handle all the cases. Conse-
quently, by threatening to go to trial, the defendant has
a stronger bargaining tool under the Act. See HousE
REPORT supra note I, at 19-21, 55, 58. See also House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 197; McGarr, Anatomy of a
Criminal Case, 75 F.R.D. 89, 285 (1976).
65 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1971).
' Levin, supra note 53, at 117-18.
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that defense counsel and defendants believe time ble.74 There is a widespread belief among defense
is an ally in bargaining.67 Where appropriate, de- counsel that a jury is less likely to convict, or at
fendant's delay may even be used to convince the least more likely to convict of a less serious crime,
prosecutor to grant him immunity from prosecu- if a long period of time has elapsed between the
tion.68 criminal event and the trial.75 Again, there are also
Not all pre-trial delay is sought for purely tacti-
cal reasons. Often, pre-trial motions are legitimate
and are made to further justice rather than to
defeat it. Motions, such as those authorized by rule
20, are clearly efficiency-oriented.s
A separate set of delay motives comes into play
in relation to the trial itself. For instance, defense
delay may be used to avoid "hard"judges. 70 Delay
may also be used by the defense to undermine the
prosecution's case. Memories of witnesses dim as
time passes, and the greater the time from the
criminal event to the trial the greater the defense
hope that witnesses will be less convincing and
more easily confused on dros -examination. 71 The
longer the trial is delayed, the greater the possibility
that witnesses will be intimidated by the defendant
or friends of the defendant.72 Moreover, long trial
delays may prove so inconvenient to a witness that
the witness becomes uncooperative t or unavaila-
'7 United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 332 (2d Cir.
1976). However, even when a defendant initially coop-
erates with the government, this will not prevent a de-
fendant from claiming that the government must bear
the risk that the defendant will renege on his agreement
to cooperate, which will result in unaccounted for time
under the Speedy Trial Act. For a not entirely satisfying
response to this issue see United States v. Lopez, 426 F.
Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"The closest explicit continuance allowed under the
Speedy Trial Act analagous to the bargaining-position
delay is that under court supervision the prosecution of
a defendant may be deferred so that the defendant may
demonstrate his good conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2).
9 F. R. CRIM. P. 20 regulates the transfer of a criminal
case from one district to another for purposes of plea and
sentence.
7o Neubauer & Cole, A Political Critique of the Court
Recommendations of the National Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, 24 EMORy L.J. 1009, 1024 (1975).
7' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1971).
72 Scaring Off Witnesses, TIME, Sept. 11, 1978, at 41.
' Speedier trials would also help witnesses less
patient than Patricia Finck, a Philadelphia A & P
cashier who went back to court 46 times to get two
stickup men convicted. "After three or four contin-
uances of a case," says Patrick Healy, the executive
director of the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion, "unless you're really a devoted witness, you'll
kiss it off. After all, what's in it for you? This
business of civic pride goes only so far. And the
smart defendant and the smart defense lawyer will
delay a case to death."
Id.
legitimate trial delay purposes such as lessening the
negative effects ofpre-trial publicity,7 6 and meeting
the unexaggerated need for further preparation
time.
77
B. Prosecutor's Interest in Delay
In many ways the prosecutor's interests in delay
are similar to those of the defense counsel. 78 Law-
yer-directed delays such as schedule conflicts79 and
vacation plans are shared by both sides.
As is true with some defendant delays, some
prosecutorial pre-trial delays are clearly unaccept-
able. Delays which are tactically designed to harass
the defendant,so indicate bad faith,8t or hamper
the ability of the defendant to defend himselfss
"strike at the fairness of our criminal process' ' 3
and are unsupportable.' Yet, other tactical delays,
such as proceedings under rule 2 0,ss interlocutory
appeals,86 incompetency proceedings 7 and similar
motions are justifiabless Prosecutors may want to
7" Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1971).
75 See Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook
County Criminal Courts, 35 U. CM. L. REv. 259, 261-62
(1968).
' 6See Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart, 427 U.S.
539, 603 n.28 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring).
' See text accompanying note 157 infra.
'The sixth amendment's speedy trial guarantee at-
taches only after a person hag been accused of a crime.
However, the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments may also provide a basis for dismiss-
ing an indictment in certain limited situations. United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
79 United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
so United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971).
"' United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
s2 See United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122, 123 (1st
Cir. 1978). In United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 646 (2d
Cir. 1975), the government's intentional inactivity pre-
vented the defendant from obtaining a youthful offender
probationary sentence since the criminal proceeding was
delayed beyond his 26th birthday.
s Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 45 n. 7 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
8 F.R. CRIM. P. 20.
m 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1) (D) (Supp. IV 1974).
17 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (l) (A) (Supp. IV 1974).
- See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h) (Supp. IV 1974) for a listing
of excludable times for various motions.
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delay trial in order to protect informers.8 Prose-
cutors may also seek a delay to better prepare their
cases, 9 await an appeal of a co-defendant, 9' try
"important" cases first,0 finish another investiga-
tion,93 or await the availability of a witness.9 Dur-
ing the pre-trial stage, plea negotiations will be
underway and may consume a great deal of time
while parties bargain for immunity, for reduced
charges and for sentences.95 A set of motives for
trial tactic delays parallel to that of the defense
may also arise. Prosecutors may wish to avoid the
"easy" judge,9 or await the testimony of witnesses
89 See United States v. Lopez, 426 F. Supp. 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which the government admitted that
the sole reason for not proceeding against the defendant
was the desire to keep concealed the informer status of a
co-defendant. In disallowing the request for an excluda-
ble time determination to be made, the court stated:
If the government's position here was sustained, it
could obtain at will an open-ended toll of the
requirements of the Speedy Trial Plan "solely upon
its desire to conceal the existence of an informer or
cooperating co-defendant. "If there [was] anything
[the Rules were] not intended to cover, it is the
blanket type of exclusion proposed by the Govern-
ment here."
Id. at 385. See also United States v. Furey, 500 F.2d 338,
343 (2d Cir. 1974). In the area of informers and pre-
indictment delay see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 797 (1976) (citing Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial:
Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REv. 525, 527-528
(1975)).
9°Under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1974),
the prosecutor must have diligently prepared in order to
have delay time excluded.
91 United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir.
1976).
92 See United States v. Douglas, 504 F.2d 213, 217
(D.C. Cir. 1974), in which Chief Judge Bazelon, in a
concurring opinion, stated that prosecuting "important"
cases before prosecuting "lesser" cases did not justify
delay in trial.
9 United States v. Rollins, 487 F.2d 409, 419 (2d Cir.
1973).
MSee Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1971);
United States v. Douglas, 504 F.2d 213, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United States v. Hillegas, 443 F. Supp. 221, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Salzmann, 417 F.
Supp. 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1977); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
5 "'Thus, if the government wishes to bargain for this
condition, it may but it should do so mindful of the risks
which it thereby assumes of dismissed indictments for
unconstitutional delay."' United States v. Carini, 562
F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Roberts, 515 F.2d, 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1975)).
9 United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
in other pending cases,9 7 join defendants for trial's
or await prosecution by state officials.99
But the parallel to defense interests in delay is
not complete. There are two major differences
between defense and prosecutor delay. First, there
are no constitutional rights involved in denying to
the prosecution the right to be represented by a
particular counsel or the ability to prepare ade-
quately. There may well be strong arguments for
guaranteeing the prosecution the time to be ade-
quately prepared, but that is a policy choice, not
a constitutional right.'00 Second, it is clear from the
case law that the burden of speedy determination
of criminal cases falls upon the prosecution. As the
Court stated in Strunk v. United States,'0' citing the
ABA standards:10 2 "Although a great many ac-
cused persons seek to put off the confrontation as
long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into
criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of
the charging authority is to provide a prompt
trial.",0 0
Since the prosecution has the duty of expediting
criminal trials, it is the prosecutor who must ulti-
mately account for all non-defendant caused de-
97 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 516 (1971) (delay in
order to secure accomplice's testimony after his convic-
tion).
"United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109
(D. Md. 1977).
"9 See United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977); United States v. Cordova,
537 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
960 (1977). United States v. LaCruz, 441 F. Supp. 1261,
1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1098 (1st
Cir. 1976).
101 412 U.S. 434 (1972).
102 Prompt disposition of criminal charges.
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor
intentionally to use procedural devices for delay for
which there is no legitimate basis.
(b) The prosecution function should be so organized
and supported with staff and facilities as to enable
it to dispose of all criminal charges promptly. The
prosecutor should be punctual in attendance in
court and in the submission of all motions, briefs
and other papers. He should emphasize to all wit-
nesses the importance of punctuality in attendance
in court.
(c) It is unprofessional conduct to misrepresent facts
or otherwise mislead the court in order to obtain a
continuance.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Ap-
proved Draft 1971).
103412 U.S. at 437.
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lay.1°4 Consequently, in looking at the prosecutor's
interest in delay, one must keep in mind that often
the prosecutor will be arguing for delay caused by
events totally outside his control. Often the prose-
cutor will be arguing for delay due to congested
court calendars,' 5 recusal of judges,'06 judge's ill-
ness 10 7 or absence from the district,lee and other




C. Judicial Interest in Delay
The motives for court-desired delay in criminal
cases are much harder to pinpoint and more diffi-
cult to characterize. From one standpoint, man-
power used to expedite criminal cases is taken away
from trying civil cases. Some judges find this un-
acceptable.1 Other judges feel that criminal cases
delayed are criminal cases which are more likely to
"plead out." '' Finally, some judges find their cal-
endars so full that it makes little difference to them
how quickly they progress. Given these factors,
many judges will readily accept the wishes of the
prosecution and defense to delay trial.
1 2
The motives for delay (lawyer-oriented, defend-
"°'As the Court noted in Barker v. Wingo: "A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should
be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than
with the defendant." 407 U.S. at 531. Many cases have
dealt with applying the analytical process of Barker v.
Wingo, including the weighing of "neutral" factors such
as crowded docket and understaffed prosecutors' offices.
See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1972);
United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148-52 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 333-37 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 829-
35 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1977); United
States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 849-53 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139, 1165-71
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1977). See
also Rudstein, supra note 47.
I"S See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 839
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
06 United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 336 (2d Cir.
1976).
'07 United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831, 840 (2d Cir.
1977).
"08 United States v. Douglas, 504 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (judge attending a professional meeting); United
States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1184 (2d Cir. 1977)
(judge holding court outside of his district).
.NUnited States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
1977) (summer recesses).
"oSee note 130 infra.
"1 Levin, supra note 53, at 114.
12Id. at 114-16.
ant comfort-oriented, and court-oriented) can be
realized through many separate tactics, whether
the mechanism to achieve delay is the "right to
adequately prepared counsel" argument or some
other argument. Under the legislative mandate
both prosecutors and defense counsel will have a
more difficult time manipulating delay to suit their
own purposes. As a result there was, and is, contin-
ued opposition to the Speedy Trial Act by the
practicing bar. The danger looms large that these
parties will join together to stipulate to a waiver of
the Act.13 That this fear is real can be seen in the
statements of the participants themselves, indicat-
ing both a great dislike and significant distrust of
the Act.
IV. PARTIcIPANTS' DISDAIN OF THE AcT
During the gestation period of the Speedy Trial
Act in Congress, it became a common occurrence
for each participant in the criminal justice system
to blame another component of the system for
delay." 4 In the words of Representative Conyers,
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime,
"Prosecutors blamed backlogged court dockets and
judges blamed prosecutors for filing indiscriminate,
multi-count indictments. For their part, prosecu-
tors and defense counsel alike found the dilatory
tactics of their adversaries as the principal cause of
delay.""n5 None of the participants were willing to
admit to the obvious fact that all of them benefited
in their own way from delay. Although the partic-
ipants were unable to agree on the cause of delay,
they did agree on one thing: the Speedy Trial Act
was an ill-conceived idea that they thought would
have an adverse effect on individual justice.
The Justice Department had long been a foe of
proposed speedy trial legislation."' In the legisla-
11 "If courts are to exercise effective calendar control
and to expedite the cases before them, they must reject
consent of the parties as a basis for granting adjourn-
ments." THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE COURTS, 86 (1967).
114 See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 20;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9. But see Judge
Zirpoli's statement that the judiciary can make the
speedy trial guarantee a reality, House Hearings, supra note
2, at 375.
n" House REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
116 For a brief history of speedy trial legislation, includ-
ing previous opposition by the Justice Department, see
Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act in Constitutional
Perspective, 47 Miss. LJ. 365, 400-06 (1976). See also
United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139, 1147-51
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1977).
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tive events which immediately preceded the pas-
sage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Justice De-
partment opposition heightened.1 7 For instance,
Attorney General Saxbe outlined six major areas
in which the Justice Department was opposed to
the pending legislation. He claimed that rule 50(b)
plans were sufficiently effective, that mandatory
dismissal was not in society's interest, that no ad-
ditional resources had been provided, that compli-
cated cases required longer time to prepare than
the provisions allowed, that the rate of guilty pleas
would be adversely affected and that the legislation
would result in more hearings and more appeals
which would further clog court calendars." 8 Even
after changes were made in response to some of
these objections, the Justice Department continued
to express its displeasure with the bill."19 Justice
Department opposition even prompted Represent-
ative Conyers to comment upon Attorney General
Saxbe's criticisms of the Act by saying that: "It
mystifies me that the Department persists in these
arguments, especially since they have been in full
partner in some forty-two months of refinement,
and have seen all but a few of over two dozen of
their suggested changes included in what is now
before the Committee. ' 12°
Strong opposition to passage of the Speedy Trial
Act also came from the judiciary. Director Kirks of
the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts not only contended that such legislation
should await further study of the effect of the rule
50(b) plans, 12 but also comnplained that the plan-
ning process of the Act and the pre-trial services
program were inappropriate.122 As Kirks noted,
"[t]he Conference has felt rather strongly that the
goal of achieving a speedy trial for every defendant
charged with crime in the district courts could be
achieved within the court structure without the
need for legislation.' 2
1" See, House REPoRT, supra note 1, at 13, 17, 54, 58,
78; House Hearings, supra note 2, at 196-222 (statements
and testimony of W. Vincent Rakestraw, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legislative Affairs; H. M. Ray,
United States Attorney, Northern District of Mississippi;
James L. Treece, United States Attorney, District of
Colorado; Earl Silbert, United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia; Mac Redwine, Legislative Counsel,
Office of Legislative Affairs).
u1 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
9 Id. at 55-58.
120 Id. at 58.
121 Id. at 50-54. See also House Hearings, supra note 2, at
176-96.
122 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 50-54.
123 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 176.
Furthermore, individual district court judges ap-
peared before Congress to make their objections
known.'2
The defense bar was represented in the House
hearings by three practitioners. Their testimony
implies that they viewed the pending legislation as
assisting their defense of clients because much of
testimony centered on the issue of dismissal with
prejudice, a matter of much concern to defense
counsel.
Subsequent to the passage of the Speedy Trial
Act, evidence exists that the participants' distrust
has not abated. For instance, some federal judges
have continued to express their displeasure with
the Act." Furthermore, some judges have ignored
its existence, t27 while others have referred to it in
opinion as "oppressive and onerous. " 2 Still others
24 Judge John Feikens, United States District Court
for the District of Eastern Michigan commented:
Now what I fear, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee, is this: That if we have to put all
of our attention on criminal cases, we will not reach
our civil docket. I am in danger right now of that.
And I point out in my statement-and I think you
ought to consider this-that there are very impor-
tant cases on the civil docket that we have to try-
the prisoners' rights petitions, the civil rights cases,
the habeas corpus applications, the civil rights cases
in which the United States is a party, and the
onslaught of cases that we are getting under title 7
in private civil rights cases....
In other words, what I am saying to you, Mr.
Chairman, is this: Whether we talk about the speedy
trial bill or whether we talk about plans under rule
50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
in courts like the Eastern District of Michigan we
already have problems. And if you say to us "Now
put these criminal cases front and center to the
exclusion of the civil cases," we can do that, but the
civil litigants are going to suffer.
House Hearings, supra note 2, at 241.
Judge Alfred Arraj, United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, was quoted by United States
Attorney Treece as saying that he had such a backlog-of
criminal cases that he could not get to the civil cases.
Therefore, Judge Arraj was going to dismiss criminal
cases. Id. at 215. See also the statements of Judge Alphon-
oso Zirpoli, United States District Court for the District
of Northern California, Id. at 365-84.
'
25 See Id. at 223-38, 248-59, 335-48.
'26 See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 551 F.2d 1377,
1382 (5th Cir. 1977).
'
2
7 See United States v. Carpenter, 542 F.2d 1132, 1134
n.l (9th Cir. 1976). See also Misner, supra note 14, at 15-
25.
128 Wood, Federal Prisoner Petitions in the Proceedings of the
Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, 75
F.R.D. 89, 340 (1976).
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have sought its repeal"s or sought major alterations
in order to return to the Rule 50(b) situation. 13°
Some judges have even flouted the intent of the
Act by "empanelling juries and then continuing
the trial for weeks, or even months."' 31 Two judges
have gone so far as to find that the Act is so onerous
and such a constraint on the judiciary, that it
violates the separation of powers clause.'3 2 Finally,
others have vented their frustration by predicting,
not without some justification, that the consequen-
tial effects of the legislation will have devastating
effects upon all judicial business.133
'
3 2 
REPORT OF THE AD Hoc SUBCOMMirEE ON THE
SPEEDY TRIAL AcT (Administrative Office of the United
States Court, undated, chaired by judge Carl B. Rubin)
[hereinafter cited as AD Hoc REPORT]. App. B, Summary
of Responses on Speedy Trial Act (8th, 9th and 10th
Circuits), 8; App. A, Analysis of Sixth Circuit Responses,
2-3. The AD Hoc REPORT was the product of a meeting
in Washington, D.C. on June 27, 1977, sponsored by the
Administrative Office and the Federal judicial Center.
Representatives from the twelve district courts which had
already moved to the 1979 standards were present, as
well as a cross section of other interested individuals
including public defenders, United States attorneys,
United States magistrates, circuit reporters, members of
the criminal defense bar, and staff counsel from subcom-
mittees of the SenateJudiciary Committee and the House
judiciary Committee. To obtain a broad-base of infor-
mation, requests for information were submitted to the
chiefjudges of all the districts. In addition, Earl J. Silbert,
United States attorney for the District of Columbia,
solicited views of all United States attorneys on the
problems created by the Act.
S130See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 129, App. A, D.C.
Circuit, 4; Second Circuit, 1. Another way to limit the
Act severely is to expand the judicial emergency provi-
sions of 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (Supp. IV 1974). See AD Hoc
REPORT, App. A, D.C. Circuit, 1, Second Circuit, 1;
Third Circuit, 4; Fourth Circuit, 2.
131 AD Hoc REPORT, App. C, 4.
132 For the most in-depth discussion, see United States
v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Md. 1977). In United
States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1976), Mr.
justice Clark, sitting by designation, noted in passing
that he viewed the Act as being constitutionally suspect.
'33 It is feared that the Speedy Trial Act will have a
number of adverse effects. The most prominent fear is
that the Act will totally disrupt the civil calendar. This
point was made by Chief justice Burger in Proceedings
of the 37th Annual judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court, 73 F.R.D. 147, 245 (1976). See
also United States v. Frazier, 547 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir.
1977); Lasher, The Court Crunch: The View From the Bench,
76 F.R.D. 245, 249 (1977); A.Hoc REPORT, supra note
129, at 6-7. Other effects will be that district judges will
be so involved with criminal cases, magistrates will be
forced to handle more civil matters. See, e.g., Loral Corp.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir.
1977). See also the remarks made by Attorney General
However, other judges have found the Act to be
a necessary element to remedy "excessive and inex-
cusable delay in bringing a defendant to trial."'3 4
Some have intimated a basic disagreement with
the wisdom of passing the Act, but believe it is
their duty to enforce it whether they think it is
"good law, bad law, or law which is partly good
and partly bad."' 35 This attitude is best expressed
by United States District Court Judge McGarr,
who has stated that:
It [the Speedy Trial Act] has provoked more violent
and emotional rhetoric than any other act that's
affected the judiciary and nobody has been more
violent or emotional than I have. I have written
letters to Congressmen and everyone else about it.
I think it's improvident, and I think it's ill consid-
ered. It's wrecking our dockets. It's going to force us
into total moratoria on civil cases while we force to
trial defendants who don't want to go to trial any-
way ....
Congress is congratulating itself that it has done
a worthwhile thing, and incidentally, very happy
that they have shown once again to the judiciary
whose the boss in this government. But it cannot be
ignored. A lot of people are devoting a lot of time
to it. We've got to comply with it.'3
The wisdom of the Act has not escaped the pointed
criticism of appellate courts as well.
37
Bell, Proceedings of the 38th Annual judicial Conference
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, 77 F.R.D. 251,
308 (1977). There is also concern that the Act will cause
prosecutors to forego some re-trials, Marting v. United
States, 411 F. Supp. 1352, 1360 (D.N.J. 1976); and not to
proceed with some "minor" crimes, United States v.
Bennett, 563 F.2d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 1977). There seems
to be some trend to blame all judicial administrative
problems on the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., Acha v.
Beame, 438 F. Supp. 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which
the court comimented that because of the Speedy Trial
Act and its effect upon the workload, factual disputes in
a discriminatory hiring practices case must be turned
over to a special master.
134 United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir.
1976).
135 United States v. Koch, 438 F. Supp. 307, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'36 McGarr, Anatomy of a Criminal Case, 75 F.R.D. 269,
285 (1976).
137 See, Burger, Year-End Report, 12 AMz. B.J. 16 (1977).
In United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.
1976), Judge Kennedy commented that: "It is discour-
aging that our highly refined and complex system of
criminal justice is suddenly faced with implementing a
statute that is so unartfully drawn as this one. But this is




Criticism of the Act by defense counsel and
prosecutors filters through court decisions. Defense
counsel are beginning to learn that "it is obvious
that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was not written
with the rights of defendants in mind. ' ta It was
also not written with the schedule conflicts or the
delay tactics of counsel in mind, whether legitimate
or not.139 Consequently, when asked what legisla-
tive action should be taken to make the Act more
amenable to defense counsel, the general recom-
mendation is to repeal it. Some defense counsel
now refer to the Act as the "Speedy Convictions
Act.'
140
Prosecutors have come to the same basic conclu-
sions regarding the Act as have defense counsel.
United States attorneys, in response to a question-
naire circulated by the United States attorney for
the District of Columbia, .expressed grave reserva-
tions about the Act. Their complaints centered on
the effect of the narrow time frames of the Act and
upon multi-defendant cases. At the heart of the
complaints was the fact that prosecutors were los-
ing control over their calendars. Some United
States attorneys suggested that the Act should be
amended to allow parties to stipulate to a waiver




Resistant attitudes of the participants have been
buttressed by the available data concerning court
experience during the phase-in, planning stage. As
the House Report commented:
The primary purpose of the planning process is to
monitor the ability of the courts to meet the time
limits of the bill and to supply the Congress with
information concerning the effects on criminal jus-
tice administration of the time limits and sanctions,
including the effects on the prosecution, the defense,
the courts and the correctional process, and the
need for additional rule changes and statutes which
would operate to make speedy trial a reality. 
1 2
Despite this, many courts have virtually ignored
the Act during the trial period and thus have been
unable to experiment with procedures to make it
effective. 43 Moreover, neither the prosecution nor
'38 United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 747 (7th
Cir. 1977). It is also clear that some counsel are ignorant
of the Act. See United States v. Strand, 566 F.2d 530, 532
(5th Cir. 1978).
13
9 See An Hoc REPORT, supra note 129, App. B, Ninth
Circuit, 2.
'40 Id. at 6.
41 AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 129, App. C.
142 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
143 Misner, supra note 14, at 15-25.
the defense have objected to the courts' failure to
operate under the Act.'" There is a certain Kaf-
kaesque irony in all this because the participants
in the criminal justice system have all predicted
that great calamities will flow from the Act, and
by refusing to use the planning provisions of the
Act they may have made their predictions a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
V. A MECHANISM OF SUBTERFUGE
One clear mechanism to translate the motives
for delay into actual delay is for the defendant to
seek a period of excludable delay by arguing that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
(either his "right" to counsel of his choice or his
right to adequately prepared counsel) will bejeop-
ardized if he is immediately forced to trial. Such a
delay, the argument goes, is excludable under the
Speedy Trial Act's "ends of justice" provision.
What can easily happen as a result is that the
prosecutor will not oppose this motion because he
has his own motives for delay. The court must
guard, with great vigilance, the independent socie-
tal reasons for quick adjudication of criminal cases,
irrespective of its own beliefs as to the wisdom of
the Speedy Trial Act.
145
A. Right to Particular Counsel
The sixth amendment right to counsel has been
seen as a "cornerstone of our national system of
ordered liberty."'' 46 However, the right to counsel
does not confer upon a defendant the absolute
right to a particular counsel. 47 Instead, federal
case law is abundantly clear that "the right of an
accused to choose his own counsel cannot be in-
sisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reason-
able and orderly court procedure."'
't
Once past this rhetoric, the appellate courts give
little guidance as to the factors to be weighed in a
balancing test. The standard raised on appeal is
144 id.
145 See notes 132-33 supra.
146 United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977) (citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 335 (1932)).
147 See, e.g., United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st
Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein. See also United States
v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.
1978); In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Robinson, 553 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
148 556 F.2d at 86. But see Drumgo v. Superior Court,




seen as the question of whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting or denying the
motion for continuance for the purpose of allowing
the defendant to be represented by counsel of his
own choice.1
49
In the balancing test, some factors have been
given short shrift by the courts. For example, a
claim that the defendant is entitled to a change of
counsel because under the federal public defender
system both the federal defender and the United
States attorney are employed by the federal gov-
ernment, unconstitutionally contravenes the spirit
of a true adversary system has been of no assistance
to the defendant.' 5° Moreover, a defendant has no
right to be represented by unlicensed counsel'51
and no absolute right to be represented by out-of-
state counsel.152
In the area of speedy trial, the right to the
counsel of one's choice most often arises in the
context of a defendant seeking a change of counsel.
In the reported cases, attention is entered upon the
defendant's motives for change, as well as the effect
that such a change would have upon court man-
agement issues. If the change of counsel is seen as
a defense ploy to gain a delay, the request is often
viewed with suspicion.'5 If the defendant is pres-
ently represented by adequate counsel, and a
change of counsel would cause a delay that would
affect the efficient management of the court,'
affect witness availability,155 or the speedy trial of
co-defendants,' 6 the request can be denied, even
when the defendant is willing "to waive any and
all constitutional and statutory right to a speedy
trial and to remain in detention."' 57 Again, it must
be emphasized that the reported case law may not
represent the practice at the trial level since the
granting of a motion to change counsel would lie
unappealed. Although for the most part the re-
ported decisions are not very helpful in establishing
'
49 See sources cited in note 148 supra.
"5 See United States v. Robinson, 553 F.2d 429 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
15' United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir.
1978).
152See In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977).
'53 See United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir.
1975). But see United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
"5 Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1969).
"' United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1978).
"5 United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977).
1
5 7 Id. at 84.
a framework for subjugating defendant's desire to
be represented by a particular counsel to speedy
trial considerations, in a few instances courts have
given clear insights into the problem. For example,
in United States v. Declet, s8 the court appointed new
counsel upon consideration of the uncertainty of
the legal aid lawyer's calendar because of trial
conflicts, the congested court calendar and the
societal interests in speedy trials as codified in the
Speedy Trial Act. The court clearly appointed new
counsel in that case to further the court's ability to
deal swiftly with its calendar.
59
B. Right to Prepared Counsel
The second major way in which delay may be
sought is through a defense claim that it needs
additional time in which to prepare for trial. The
attractiveness of the argument to allow more time
for the defense to prepare must be understood not
only in the context of the motives for delay by the
defense, the court, and the prosecutor but also in
its procedural context. The time limits of the
Speedy Trial Act do not begin to run until after an
arrest has been made or an indictment handed
down. Consequently, there will be instances where
the prosecution will have had months or years to
investigate and prepare before the time limits begin
to run. The reported decisions in the area deal
basically with the denial of the continuance and
therefore may not accurately depict what actually
occurs at the trial level.
The case law is most often conclusory and merely
limited to findings that the record does not support
a claim that the trial court's inherent ability to
control its own docket was abused.' 6 Although one
may isolate cases which recite, for example, that
defendant's counsel had six weeks to prepare for
what the court found to be a rather simple case,'
61
"5 432 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59 Id. at 623-24.
'60 See, e.g., United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095,
1098-99 (1st Cir. 1976).
161 United States y. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 747 (7th
Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146,
153 (8th Cir. 1978) (19 days to prepare); United States
v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 909 (1977) (9 days to prepare); United States v.
Anderson, 561 F.2d 1301, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 943 (1977) (2 months to prepare); United States v.
Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366, 1371-78 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 866 (1977) (33 days to prepare); United States
v. Savage, 430 F. Supp. 1024 (M.D.Pa.) (10 days to
prepare), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir. 1977); Pope v.
State, 140 Ga. App. 549, 550, 231 S.E.2d 549, 550-51
(1976) (1 week to prepare); Russell v. State 559 S.W.2d
7, 9-10 (Ark. 1978) (20 days to prepare).
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the reference to the time available to defense coun-
sel is usually followed by rhetoric to the effect that:
The parties agree that a ruling denying a motion
for a continuance is not subject to review unless
there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or
that a manifest injustice would result.... It has
likewise long been recognized that there are no
mechanical tests to be applied and that "[tjhe an-
swer must be found in the circumstances [ofq each
case, particularly in the reasons presented to the
trial judge."'
162
The Supreme Court has adopted this analysis as
well. In fact, it is only when the facts of the given
case are so egregious as to be shocking that the
Supreme Court has stepped in. For example, in
Avery v. Alabama,i16 the defendant was forced to
trial two days after his arrest and the appointment
of counsel. However, even in this seemingly outra-
geous situation, the Court continued its historical
hands-off policy and upheld the conviction. The
Court took the classic approach that appellate
courts have since used in viewing continuance
requests and their relation to adequate represen-
tation by counsel:
Since the Constitution nowhere specifies any pe-
riod which must intervene between the required
appointment of counsel and trial, the fact, standing
alone, that a continuance has been denied, does not
constitute a denial of the constitutional right to
assistance of counsel. In the course of trial, after due
appointment of competent counsel, many proce-
dural questions necessarily arise which must be
decided by the trial judge in the light of facts then
presented and conditions then existing. Disposition
of a request for continuance is of this nature and is
made in the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise
of which will ordinarily not be reviewed.
But the denial of opportunity for appointed coun-
sel to confer, to consult with the accused and to
prepare his defense, could convert the appointment
of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a
formal compliance with the Constitution's require-
ment that an accused be given the assistance of'
counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance
of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal ap-
pointment. 164
The difficulty in applying the past case law to
the perceived possibility of defense and prosecution
jointly undermining the Speedy Trial Act is that
162 United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 747 (7th
Cir. 1977).
10 308 U.S. 444 (1939).
'64 Id. at 446.
the past case law has been basically unconcerned
with the common practice of continuances stipu-
lated to by both the defense and prosecution.16 In
the words of the Seventh Circuit, commenting
upon the Speedy Trial Act, "the necessary expe-
ditious disposal of criminal cases requires the most
effective use of the time permitted for trial prepa-
ration without reliance upon the routine continu-
ances that may have been customary in the
past."' 66 What must be done is for the trial courts
to take the broad guidelines as suggested by the
case law,167 by the standards of the American Bar
Association,'68 and by commentators, i r and flesh
out those guidelines with the facts of a particular
case whenever a continuance is sought. Not only
would such a process present a meaningful record
on appeal, but also it would help guard against
defense-prosecution complicity in undermining the
Speedy Trial Act.
VI. THE PRoCEsS OF ADEQUATE DOcUMENTATION
The correctness of the decision to grant or deny
a motion for continuance turns upon the facts of
the given case. However, the Speedy Trial-Act
demands more. In order to guarantee that societal
interests in speedy resolution of criminal matters
do not receive short shrift, courts can no longer
grant continuance merely because the participants
agree. The Act is structured to account for all the
165
The judges almost never forcefully interfere with
the attorneys' pursuit of their goals, even though
they are aware that they often are associated with
delay. For instance, the judges' routine granting of
continuances, especially without a time-consuming
formal explanation, allows the attorney to use them
to his own ends .... Nor did criminal division judges
iequire reasons for continuances: some judges in
this court were willing to permit as many continu-
ances as the defense and prosecution were willing to
arrange.
Levin, supra note 53, at 114.
1"United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 749 (7th
Cir. 1977).
167The individual cases discussed in this article may
be of some assistance as similar factual situations recur.
The difficulty is that often the reputed cases do not
contain sufficient information on all relevant factors. For
a more detailed court synopsis of delay cases, see United
States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1977).
'
68 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft, 1968) § 1.3.
169 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIssION ON CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, STANDARD 4.12;
PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-




time between arrest and indictment.17 0 Thus, in
practice, parties may not stipulate to continu-
ances,17 1 nor waive the applicability of the Act's
provisions. 7 2 The Act requires that the court bal-
ance, on the record, the competing interests of
court management and participants' desires.1 73 The
documentation process recommended is a simple
one that will not contribute to the problem of
delay. The process, however, does require that
,lawyers be prepared to justify their requests for
additional time and that judges will be unswerving
in their resolve not to honour undocumented re-
quests for delay.
The procedure needed to make the goals of the
Act attainable can best be illustrated by analyzing
the ends of justice exclusion as it applies to the
right-to-counsel delay mechanism. Two subject
matters need to be discussed: the degree of speci-
ficity required to justify a continuance and the
balancing technique to be used in weighing the
competing interests.
In terms of the defendant's desire to be repre-
sented by a particular counsel and his right to be
represented by adequately prepared counsel, those
continuance which in the past have been granted
in a routine, uncritical way must now be justified
under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8). 174 The statute re-
quires reasons for finding that "the ends ofjustice
served by the granting of such continuance out-
weigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial."' 75 The statute lists
17
0 See United States v. Hillegas, 443 F. Supp. 221, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. La Cruz, 441 F. Supp.
1261, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"7 See United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 749
(7th Cir. 1977).
172
Underlying the government position is the premise
that the public, the defendant and the prosecutor
all have the same interest in prompt disposition,
and thus the public interest is adequately repre-
sented when the defendant and the prosecutor agree
to a waiver. But if such were the case, there would
have been no need to enact the Plan. The court in
promulgating the Plan-and Congress in enacting
the Speedy Trial Act-has determined that the
immediate participants cannot be relied upon to
further the public interest in prompt disposition
... It would be antithetical to this entire design if
the parties were permitted to free themselves from
the constraints imposed by the Plan through the
simple expedient of the willing defendant signing a
waiver. United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp.
1119, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
'7J 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (Supp. IV 1974).
174 id.
'1 d.
three non-exclusive factors which are to be consid-
ered when making the determination regarding the
"ends of justice":
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance
in the proceeding would be likely to make a contin-
uance of such proceeding impossible, or result in a
miscarriage of justice.
(ii) Whether the case taken as a whole is so unusual
and so complex, due to the number of defendants
or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that
it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation
within the periods of time established by this sec-
tion.
(iii) Whether delay after the grandjury proceedings
have commenced, in case where arrest precedes
indictment, is caused by the unusual complexity of
the factual determination to be made by the grand
jury or by events beyond the control of the court or
the Government.
176
The provision concludes with the statement that
no continuance is available "because of general
congestion of the courts' calendar, or lack of dili-
gent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the attorney for the Gov-
ernment."'
' 7
It would appear that the legislative intent in
establishing the "ends of justice" exclusion was
that:
In order to avoid the pitfalls of unnecessary rigidity
on the one hand, and a loop-hole which would
nullify the intent of the legislation on the other, a
balancing test is established in order to enable the
judge to determine when the 'ends ofjustice' require
an extraordinary suspension of the time limits.1
78
But, to guarantee that the Act is not made a
sham at the trial level and to give the appellate
court an adequate record on appeal, specific find-
ings supporting the three listed factors must be
required.
The degree of specificity required of the trial
court can be gleaned from the legislative history.
In the Senate Report, for example, the "Watergate
case" is discussed in terms of the "ends of justice"
exclusion. As the report states, "Although a case
like the alleged conspiracy involving the so-called
'Watergate case' might normally be subject to a
continuance under this provision because of its
complexity, society's interest in a speedy trial in
176 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
'77 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (Supp. 1974).
178 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 21.
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light of the then upcoming election might have
outweighed that consideration.',
179
In discussing the applicability of the three listed
factors, the Senate Report detailed what factual
situations would fall within the categories. One
example given in the Senate Report is that when
determining whether to give counsel more time to
prepare, the court should look to the probable
length of trial based upon a weighted caseload
formula developed by the Federal Judicial Center
to determine the actual amount of time spent on
different kinds of cases. 18° Although Congress re-
jected a blanket exception for complicated federal
prosecution, experience with certain types of cases
will put the court on notice of the potential need
for further time. 18 In contrast to the old case law
which virtually guaranteed disparity from case to
case, the Speedy Trial Act creates a process which
requires specific reasons for delay at the trial level
which will eventually result in a body of common
law continuances giving guidance to the district
courts on how to strike the balance among the
competing interests in the speedy trial area.
t8
Other types of factors regarding the need for
additional time can be identified. If the need for a
continuance is arguably urgent, it should be rec-
ognized early in the process.183 This is not to sug-
gest, however, that "surprises" will not occur in
criminal cases.
84
l9 Id. at 40.
... Id. For a discussion of the weighted caseload for-
mula see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1971, at
167.
181 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
182 Se, e.g., Plan for the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona for Achieving Prompt Dispo-
sition of Criminal Cases § 4a, which requires jhe clerk to
maintain a separate file for all orders authorizing ends of
justice exclusions.
183 See United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 749
(7th Cir. 1977).
,8'The GUIDELINES of the Administrative Office, supra
note 25, discuss additional factors.
The other instance involves the "complex" case.
Complexity in criminal cases results inter alia from
complex issues, multiple parties or extensive docu-
mentary evidence. Cases fitting into this pattern
frequently include antitrust, mail fraud, conspiracy
and net worth income tax cases, among others,
which cases may require a whole series of pretrial
conferences, as well as other protracted proceedings.
See: "Pre-Trial Procedures in Big Criminal Cases",
Judicial Conference Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, pp.
47-50; Judge Irving R. Kaufman, "Problems in
In the right to adequately prepared counsel
when the claim is made in a broad statement that
the case is complex and further time to prepare is
needed, the court should require the defense coun-
sel to show specifically what is yet to be done and
how long it will take to accomplish. Possible mo-
tives for delay should be scrutinized. In the change
of counsel situation, the court should inquire as to
what differences exist between counsel and defend-
ant that make the change necessary. Only upon a
record of this specificity can realistic review and
precedential use of the case be made.
In order to accomplish the need for rather de-
tailed justifications for continuances under the
"ends ofjustice" exclusion, the local criminal rules
may need to be modified in a number of ways.
Whenever possible, motions for continuances under
this provision should be in writing and should be
accompanied by a proposed set" of findings of
fact.ss Where appropriate, motions for continu-
ances should contain an affidavit of counsel refer-
ring to the facts which underlie the need for addi-
tional time. The onus should be placed upon coun-
sel in the "ends ofjustice" cases just as the burden
is placed upon counsel in the other facets of the
criminal trial. Secondly, procedures must be estab-
lished so that upon motion of either the defense or
the prosecution, determinations regarding exclud-
able time may be made by a judge other than the
trial judge, or a judge ex parle and in camera when
questions of confidentially arise.'s" Finally, to as-
sure that a judge can make informed decisions
about the effect of delay upon the administration
of the calendar within the district, the clerk must
Protracted Criminal Cases", 23 F.R.D. 551; Judge
Joe E. Estes, "Pre-Trial Conferences in Criminal
Cases", 23 F.R.D. 560. After an indictment is filed,
the court can determine from the nature of the case
whether it is "unusual or complex" within the
meaning of Section 3161 (h) (8) (B) (ii).
Finally, it should be noted that cases may be held
in abeyance awaiting a decision of the court of
appeals or Supreme Court which would be disposi-
tive of the case. Section 3161(h)(8) would be appli-
cable.
'85 See United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, Rule 91. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS
97 (1973).
lS61n the analagous situation of allowing counsel to
withdraw for an alleged conflict of interest, a similar
process was suggested by Judge (now Justice) Stevens.
United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir.
1975). See Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases:
A Critical Appraisal, 65 VA. L. REv. 939 (1978).
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have in a usable format the data required under
18 U.S.C. §§ 3166 and 3170.'8 7
iS7 18 U.S.C. §§ 3166, 3170 (Supp. IV 1974).
§ 3166. District plans-contents.
(a) Each plan shall include a description of the
time limits, procedural techniques, innovations, sys-
tems and other methods, including the developmint
of reliable methods for gathering and monitoring
information and statistics, by which the district
court, the United States attorney, the Federal public
defender, if any, and private attorneys experienced
in the defense of criminal cases, have expedited or
intend to expedite the trial to other disposition of
criminal cases, consistent with the time limits and
other objectives of this chapter.
(b) Each plan shall include information concern-
ing the implementation of the time limits and other
objectives of this chapter, including:
(I) the incidence of, and reasons for, re-
quests or allowances of extensions of time be-
yond statutory or district standards;
(2) the incidence of, and reasons for, pe-
riods of delay under section 3161(h) of this
title;
(3) the incidence of, and reasons for, the
invocation of sanctions for noncompliance
with time standards, or the failure to invoke
such sanction, and the nature of the sanction,
if any, invoked for noncompliance;
(4) the new timetable set, or requested to
be set, for an extension;
(5) the effect on criminal justice adminis-
tration of the prevailing time limits and sanc-
tions, including the effects on the prosecution,
the defense, the courts, the correctional proc-
ess, costs, transfers and appeals;
(6) the incidence and length of, reasons for,
and remedies for detention prior to trial, and
information required by the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating
to the supervision of detention pending trial;
(7) the identity of cases which, because of
their special characteristics, deserve separate
or different time limits as a matter of statutory
classifications; and
(8) the incidence of, and reasons for, each
thirty-day extension under section 3161(b)
with respect to an indictment in that district.
(c) Each district plan required by section 3165
shall include information and statistics concerning
the administration of criminal justice within the
district, including, but not limited to:
(1) the time span between arrest and in-
dictment, indictment and trial, and conviction
and sentencing;
(2) the number of matters presented to the
United States Attorney for prosecution, and
the numbers of such matters prosecuted and
not prosecuted;
(3) the number of matters transferred to
other districts or to States for prosecution;
(4) the number of cases disposed of by trial
and plea;
In the limited experience to date with the "ends
of justice" exclusion, every indication is that the
courts have not been very specific in justifying
continuances. For example, in the United States
District Court for Arizona, whenever an interest of
justice exclusion is found by the Court, the court-
room deputy clerk merely checks a form indicating
under which of the three listed factors the judge
(5) the rates of nolle prosequi, dismissal,
acquittal, conviction, diversion, or other dis-
position; and
(6) the extent of preadjudication detention
and release, by numbers of defendants and
days in custody or at liberty prior to disposi-
tion.
(d) Each plan shall further specify the rule
changes, statutory amendments, and appropriations
needed to effectuate further improvements in the
administration ofjustice in the district which cannot
be accomplished without such amendments or
funds.
(e) Each plan shall include recommendations to
the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts for reporting forms, procedures, and time
requirements. The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, with the ap-
proval of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, shall prescribe such forms and procedures
and time requirements consistent with section 3170
after consideration of the recommendations con-
tained in the district plan and the need to reflect
both unique local conditions and uniform national
reporting standards.
§ 3170. Speedy trial data.
(a) To facilitate the planning process and the
implementation of the time limits and objectives of
this chapter, the clerk of each district court shall
assemble the information and compile the statistics
required by sections 3166(b) and (c) of this title.
The clerk of each district court shall assemble such
information and compile such statistics on such
forms and under such regulations as the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts shall
prescribe with the approval of the Judicial Confer-
ence and after consultation with the Attorney Gen-
eral.
(b) The clerk of each district court is authorized
to obtain the information required by sections
3166(b) and (c) from all relevant sources including
the United States Attorney, federal Public De-
fender, private defense counsel appearing in crimi-
nal cases in the district, United States district court
judges, and the chief Federal Probation Officer for
the district. This subsection shall not be construed
to require the release of any confidential or privi-
leged information.
(c) The information and statistics compiled by
the clerk pursuant to this section shall be made
available to the district court, the planning group,
the circuit council, and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts.
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has determined the case falls.as No factual basis
appears. In fact, it appears that in most district
courts continuances are.routinely being made as if
the Speedy Trial Act had never been passed.s
The district court decision in United States v.
TusseU,'9 is an example of an inadequate finding
in regard to the "ends ofjustice" exclusion. In that
case the inadequate finding was not the result of
the district judge's being unconcerned with the Act
or unwilling to state his reasons on the record.
Rather, the record simply did not go far enough.
This multi-defendant case contained motions by
defendants to suppress allegedly illegally obtained
evidence. In excluding certain time periods, the
court said:
Eight of the defendants have trial deadlines of
July 18, 1977, and one of the two remaining de-
fendants has a deadline of July 20. Consideration of
the suppression motions will require a hearing,
which will commence on Thursday, July 28, 1977,
at 10:00 A.M. The period of time beginning with
these deadlines and ending in July 27, the day
before the hearing, will be excluded in accordance
with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8). The number of
defendants involved in this matter, along with a
proliferation of joint and individual pretrial mo-
tions, has complicated management of this case.
When a case is made especially complex by the
"number of defendants, or the nature of the prose-
cution, or otherwise," Congress has provided for
additional periods of excludable time. See id. §
3161(h)(8), and will order periods of exclusion up
until the day of the hearing, and additional periods
if thereafter necessary and appropriate.1 91
The court had before it facts which should have
led to the conclusion that judicial time could best
be spent considering defendant's motions together
as they apparently involved similar or identical
facts and the prospective delay would have been
relatively short. Specific reference to the facts of
the crowded docket as supplied by the clerk under
section 3166, 9 as well as how judicial time would
better be spent, should have been made. The Court
should have referred to section 3161(h) (8) (A) and
made the balance of the above facts to conclude
that "the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and
the defendant in a speedy trial."
'8 The form used by the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona is available upon request from
the author.
I" See Misner, supra note 14, at 21-22.
'90 445 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
191 Id. at 1-2.
'92 18 U.S.C. § 3166 (Supp. IV 1974).
Instead, the court incorrectly moved into subsec-
tion (B) and attempted to use one of the non-
inclusive factors to justify what was already justi-
fiable. The trial court took out of context the
statement "number of defendants, or the nature of
the prosecution, or otherwise"' 9 3 and applied it to
the continuance to consolidate motions for a hear-
ing when the subsection only applies to the ques-
tion of whether a continuance should be granted
for further preparation.
The process of giving specific reasons need not
be an onerous task. It does, however, require that
the continuance be justified on the record. For
example, in the fraud and racketeering trial of
Governor Marvin Mandel, the district court justi-
fied a delay under the "ends of justice" with the
following:
The Court has been advised by counsel that as
many as four members of the Maryland Legislature
can be expected to be called as witnesses for both
the Government and the defense on any given day
of the trial. These officials were elected by the
citizens of Maryland to serve them in government.
The Court is of the opinion that the legislators
cannot adequately serve the citizenship unless the
Governor is present at the legislative session to
confer with them from time to time. In addition, a
trial date which would require legislators to be
absent from the present session may serve to disrupt
the legislative process.
19
Additionally, the court addressed a second reason
for the delay:
Several of the defendants contend that much of the
publicity surrounding the first trial will dissipate if
the trial is delayed for a reasonable time. The Court
has examined many of the newspaper clippings and
television and radio transcripts submitted by de-
fendant Mandel. An April 13 trial date will result
in a four month period between the date the mistrial
was declared and the date of the retrial. In the
opinion of the Court, it is likely that much of the
publicity surrounding the first trial will dissipate
during this time.1ss
This second reason is much more difficult to
justify factually than the first. It may very well be
true that a four-month delay would dissipate much
of the pre-trial publicity. It is hoped as the pre-trial
publicity issue arises in cases over time that better
insights might be gained into the area. For exam-
ple, issues concerning the use of opinion polls and
the differing effects of publicity in large versus
'93 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).





small communities can be developed. However, in
Mandel, the court should have commented on the
effect that the delay would have had upon the
court's calendar and on the possibility of a change
of venue"9 to avoid both the delay and the problem
of pre-trial publicity.
9 7
It is impossible to cover all situations in which
the "ends of justice" exclusion might arise. In
anticipating the July 1, 1979, effective date of the
Act, one can set up broad guidelines as to how the
balancing process may work and then anticipate
that, over the course of time, the framework will
be filled in through the ongoing process of litiga-
tion.
There are certain types of delay that fall outside
the "ends ofjustice" exclusion. The Act states that
no continuance "shall be granted because of gen-
eral congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of
diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the attorney for the Gov-
ernment.""Iss These do not apply to the right-to-
counsel situations. Toward this end of the spectrum
of acceptable reasons for delay, however, one would
expect to find delay motivated by a concern for
defendant's comfort. Moving toward more accept-
able reasons for delay, one finds health problems
of defense counsel and schedule conflicts of defense
counsel asjustifying short delays, but delays longer
than two weeks should be granted only when the
case is so complex or the lawyer-client relationship
so unique that substitution of other counsel would
be inappropriate. If continuance is sought for ad-
ditional preparation time, detailed facts about
what is yet unprepared and why preparation will
take the time sought by the defendant should be
required."9 Information as to the time that the
prosecution requires to prepare its case may be
influential here, as well as court records concerning
the billable time of private counsel for representa-
tion pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act.200
i96 The court in Mandel did discuss the venue issue, but
not in its possible relationship with the Speedy Trial Act.
Id. at 98.
19 In his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1975), Mr. Justice Bren-
nan anticipated the publicity problem. "However, even
short continuances can be effective in attenuating the
impact of publicity, especially as other news crowds past
events off the front pages. And somewhat substantial
delays designed to ensure fair proceedings need not trans-
gress the speedy trial guarantee. See Groppi v. Wisconsin,
400 U.S. 505,510 (1971); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3616(h)(8) (1970
ed., Supp. IV)" Id. at 602 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1'" 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1974).
15 9 See text accompanying note 184 supra.
2'0 18 U.S.C. § 3006 (Supp. 1978).
Merely because a case is, for example, a tax con-
spiracy case, is not in and of itself sufficient to
justify a continuance.
The final topic area requiring discussion in the
balancing of societal interests and defendant's in-
terest in speedy trial, is the situation in which
defense counsel is dilatory, yet the defendant him-
self has not participated in the delay. In this area
it is suggested that the court be guided by the
House Report:
Although the Committee cannot foresee any excuses
for institutional delay which would justify granting
a continuance, it does believe that the lack of dili-
gent preparation or failure to obtain available wit-
nesses on the part of the defendant or his attorney
could result in a miscarriage of justice and, there-
fore, exempts these reasons from prohibiting a de-
fendant or his counsel from seeking a continuance.
For example, when a defendant's counsel, either
intentionally or by lack of diligence fails to properly
prepare his client's case, either he or the defendant
might seek a continuance on the ground that forcing
the defendant to go to trial on the date scheduled
would deny the defendant the benefits of a prepared
counsel. The court in this situation would determine
whether the defendant participated actively in the
delay or whether his counsel alone was responsible
for it. If the defendant did not cause the delay, he
should not be penalized by being forced to go to
trial with an unprepared counsel. In this case, he
should be permitted enough time to seek a new
couniel and to properly prepare his case for trial. In
the event that the defendant actively participated
in the delay, then no miscarriage of justice has
occurred and the court should deny the defendant's
or his counsel's request for a continuance and re-
quire the trial to commence on the scheduled date.
This is consistent with the well-reasoned view that
a defendant should not profit doubly from delay he
is responsible for.
20 1
Although a strong, aggressive policy of continu-
ance-justification is absolutely necessary, one can-
not punish the defendant by taking away his day
in court because of the misguided antics of his
counsel. In these situations, other sanctions of the
Act may be appropriate.=n
CONCLUSION
The Speedy Trial Act is a proper legislative
response to the real problem of delay in the admin-
istration of criminal justice. To remedy this prob-
lem, it was Congress'judgment that societal inter-
ests in quick resolution of criminal charges were
20 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
m See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
1979]
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inadequately addressed by the participants of the
system. The inadequate protection stems basically
from the fact that all participants in the system
have separate, but identifiable reasons for delay. In
order to further their individual delay interests, it
is very possible that the prosecutor and defense
counsel may attempt to stipulate to waivers of the
Act's time provisions and the common practice of
stipulated continuances may be perpetuated. If the
practice of stipulated continuances is allowed to
exist after the July 1, 1979, full implementation
date of the Speedy Trial Act, the Act will be
rendered virtually useless.
To avoid this result and to implement the man-
dated legislative solution to the delay problem in
criminal cases, courts must require that all requests
for delay be adequately documented and that all
excludable time decisions under the broad "ends
of justice" provision be factually supported. If de-
fense counsel seeks an "ends of justice" exclusion
based upon either a claimed need for more prepa-
ration time or upon a claim that the defendant's
choice of retained counsel is unavailable within the
time required by the Act for trial, the trial judge
must investigate the factual basis for the request.
As the Speedy Trial Act goes into full effect, the
judiciary must require specificity in granting con-
tinuances and cease the time-honored practice of
allowing counsel to stipulate to delay. Without
such a commitment from the courts, the goals of
the Speedy Trial Act will not be reached and
justice will again be delayed and denied.
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